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the Moral Acceptability of Prostitution
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I

argue that prostitution can be considered morally acceptable on the basis that it is not harmful, in a deontological
Kantian sense, and that it is not unlike many other professions, in which a service is exchanged for money. In my
discussion, I narrow prostitution to mean consensual sexual acts
between two people in which one person performs a sexual service for monetary compensation. Whereas I do not want to attempt to define prostitution but rather evaluate its morality, I
choose this narrow definition for the sake of clarity in my argument.
In the following examination of prostitution, I begin by
summarizing philosopher David Benatar’s distinction between
the “significance view” and the “casual view” of sex.1 With this
distinction in mind, I deconstruct Kant’s theory that casual sex is
morally unacceptable because it uses a person merely as a means
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ways involve treating someone as merely a means. I also describe Irving Singer‘s objection to Kant‘s theory, which shows
that, even if sex treats someone as merely a means, it does not
always have to objectify him or her. After I have demonstrated
that Kant‘s ethical theory cannot set up a viable case against casual sex, I link casual sex to prostitution to show that it is morally
acceptable to have casual sex and to sell it. I then reject objections raised by Melissa Farley and Howard Klepper, who want to
claim that prostitution is always immoral. I conclude my argument by illustrating the similarities between prostitution and
dressing up as a shopping mall Santa Claus, two jobs with common duties and uses of the body that should both be considered
morally acceptable.
In order to contextualize Kant‘s argument, let‘s lay-out
what David Benatar calls the two ways of thinking about sex:
the ―significance view‖ of sex and the ―casual view of sex‖.2 The
―significance view‖ of sex regards sex as morally acceptable only
if it occurs within the context of a loving relationship where there
is ―reciprocal love and affection,‖ because sex must serve to
―signify love in order to be permissible.‖3 By contrast, the ―casual
view‖ of sex basically denies the ―significance view,‖ claiming
that sex ―need not have this significance in order to be morally
permissible.‖4 Under the casual view, sexual pleasure is like any
other pleasure and should be subjected to the same moral constraints to which other pleasures are subjected.
With these two views of sex in mind, I will now examine
Kant‘s argument regarding the immorality of casual sex, showing that he ultimately takes the significance view of sex. In his
Lecture on Ethics, Kant sets up his initial argument against casual
sex by applying his deontological ethical theory to sexual desire.
His ethical theory claims that a person should not treat another
person only as a means without a respective end—end meaning
personal autonomy as a rational agent in which goals, desires,
and aspirations may be pursued.5 Kant applies this ethical theory
to casual sex, claiming that it treats persons as a mere means
without an end by way of reducing people to an ―instrument of
service,‖ by failing to recognize their autonomy.6
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Casual sex, Kant argues, involves a person reducing another person to an object—a heap of flesh—with which the person can satisfy a sexual ―appetite‖.7 He claims that the person
who becomes the object of sexual pleasure during sex must sacrifice his/her body (and thus ―humanity‖) in its entirety in order
to become the object of pleasure. He denies that a person can
maintain his/her humanity by using only certain parts of the
body in sex, claiming that these parts cannot be separated from
the rest of the body in sexual interactions.8 He attempts to clarify
the way in which a person sacrifices the entire body and humanity by claiming that a person does not have possession over his/
her body. A person is a subject who owns things.9 A person cannot be a thing and a person at the same time. So, a person cannot
be a thing to be owned. Thus, Kant argues that a person does not
possess his/her body. Rather, a person and the body are synonymous and are simultaneously used or not used by other persons. Here Kant seems to reject Cartesian dualism of the body
and mind, in that the body cannot be used in a certain way while
the mind still possesses autonomy. His claim suggests that the
mind and the body, when engaged in sexual activities, lose
autonomy, because the person as a whole is objectified.
At this point, however, an important question remains:
How does Kant consider marital sex morally acceptable if all sex
involves objectifying a person for the enjoyment of another? He
does not claim that sex within marriage does not objectify those
involved.10 He does, however, claim that in marriage, both people equally posses each other, because they have a pact to respect
each other‘s humanity in a long-term relationship. Kant claims
that in marriage ―both possess each other‖, and ―that only
therein does the property of the one remain that of the other, so
that it lasts enduringly and is not transitory‖.11 Therefore, each
person has a ―pact‖ which is not ―transitory‖— which would not
be the case in casual sex—in which both persons ―possess‖ one
another such that they each must take into account the other‘s
―personhood‖.12 In other words, the pact in marriage serves to
reconcile the harms of sexual desire by giving both persons mutual power over their partners.
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Here, I want to note a contradiction in Kant‘s argument:
in marriage two people ―possess‖ one another, but Kant also
claims that man cannot own himself, because he is a subject that
owns other things, not a thing that can be owned. When Kant
argues that a person does not have possession over his/her
body, he makes the case by saying that persons can own only
―things,‖ not persons.13 However, in marriage, he claims that
people possess their partners. This leads either to the conclusion
that, under Kant‘s reasoning, sexual activity cannot occur in a
context in which it is morally acceptable, or that marriage entails
a unique form of possession in which the two people involved do
not possess one another entirely, but rather possess part of the
other person, such as his/her sexuality. However, as I have already noted, Kant argues that sexuality entails a person in his/
her entirety and cannot be separated as a part of that person. So,
Kant‘s argument with regards to possession within marriage
seems to be flawed or, at best, to use vague terms which are inconsistent throughout the argument.
Furthermore, I think Kant‘s idea of sex as an appetite,
similar to other appetites like hunger or taste, inaccurately reduces it to a hedonistic desire, a characterization that is unrealistic if we consider how sexual desire is satiated. Here I think it
useful to compare hunger as an appetite with sexual desire.
When we are extremely hungry and seek to satisfy our hunger,
we do not seek out a particular Big Mac, but rather we seek anything that will satisfy our strong urge to eat. By contrast, sexual
desire is aimed much more narrowly towards a certain person or
type of person, whether it is Daniel who lives down the block, all
men, or Hispanic flamenco dancers. Sexual desire entails much
more preference, in that it must be satiated in particular way,
which is unlike hunger, which can be satiated with any type of
food. Even if we consider that a person might be attracted to a
certain aspect of another person‘s body, such as a genitalia or
what Singer calls the ―erotogenic zone,‖ I argue that the person is
attracted to the bodily aspect, because it belongs to a certain person or type of person. For example, a male might admire another female‘s buttocks and desire to engage in sexual acts with
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it, but the male would most likely not admire the buttocks if the
same buttocks belonged to another man or his mother. Therefore, to a certain extent, the man admires the buttocks only as it
belongs to the person on whom he sees it.
This understanding seems to disprove Kant‘s claim that
we are purely interested in another person as an ―instrument of
service‖ in an objectified form, without humanity. If what Kant
thinks were actually the case, then the personal makeup, or humanity of the person with whom one wants to attain sexual
pleasure would never matter, as long as the person could provide sensual satisfaction. That seems empirically wrong. Sexual
desire seems much more potentially selective than hunger or
thirst, and so this suggests something qualitatively different
about sex when compared to other appetites.
Irving Singer has an additional objection to Kant‘s argument. Although Singer agrees with Kant about sexuality involving an entire person rather than parts of a person, he disagrees
with Kant on the point that sexuality reduces an entire person to
an objectification of the genitalia or ―erotogenic zone‖ which is
always harmful.14 He believes, by contrast, that sexual desire is a
means by which a person can enjoy another person as a way of
drawing ―sustenance‖ from one another without ―diminishing‖
either person.15 For example, suppose two people share an obsession with polka-dotted furniture, and this is the only thing the
two know about each other. In this case, both people think of
and enjoy the other person solely as a person who enjoys this
type of furniture, meaning that each can reduce the other to an
object of enjoyment, in which one characteristic of the person
represents the person in his/her entirety. However, Singer argues that the humanity of the two does not have to be
―diminished‖ for each to share in this obsession.
Rather, each person can benefit by ―drawing sustenance‖
from the other. The two polka-dot lovers can enjoy one another
solely through their shared obsession. They can still respect each
other‘s autonomy. In Kantian terms, they can treat each other as
a means to an end, but respect each other precisely because of
this. Their shared interest provides a benefit to both of them and
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it does not harm either of them. Along these lines, Singer criticizes Kant for thinking that sexuality ―treats the other person as
an object of selfish appetite,‖ in which a mutual concern for one
another and mutual benefit cannot be present together without a
person being objectified and also harmed.16 That objectification
does not always entail harm is the point at which Singer disagrees with Kant. Irving similarly believes that sexual acts can
occur with both people using each other purely for sexual reasons, but where each person doesn‘t limit the autonomy of the
other person by using them in this way.
Kant‘s claim that sexual desire always harmfully objectifies a person aligns him with Benatar‘s significance view of sex.
Kant sees sex as a unique case of desire, having some unique
quality: ―We can never find that a human being can be the object
of another‘s enjoyment, save through the sexual impulse.‖ 17
Kant takes an even more extreme approach than Benatar when
he claims that marriage is the only context in which this kind of
mutual concern can occur. Kant fails to adequately establish why
sexual desire differs from other desires, even those as similar as
wanting a massage (something judged harmless). Perhaps, if he
spent time explaining why sexual desire is different from other
appetites, then his argument would be more convincing.
I have demonstrated the way in which sexual desire can
be considered different from other appetites, but Kant does not
accept this view. His argument is weak because he equates sexual desire with other appetites while also claiming that it objectifies persons unlike the other appetites. With this major flaw in
mind, I think a more suitable definition for casual sex can be
found along the lines of Singer‘s argument: casual sex is morally
acceptable as long as both people involved consider the autonomy of the other person, and, despite the fact that sexual pleasure is the means by which the two think of each other, they do
not harmfully ―objectify‖ each other but rather mutually benefit
from their interaction.
At this stage, it is important to note that, just because casual sex is morally acceptable, prostitution is not necessarily also
morally acceptable. There are many things that are morally ac-
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ceptable to do but are not morally acceptable to sell. For example, forgiveness is something we view as morally acceptable to
do but not necessarily permissible to sell. I believe most people
would find that, if I were to be extremely wronged by a friend, it
would be morally acceptable for me to forgive him but not to
charge him money for my forgiveness. The difference here, however, seems to be that, if I charged him money, I would not be
selling a service but rather selling a personal attitude, which affects how I treat our relationship within the realm of our personal lives. By contrast, prostitution, as long as it is impersonal
and professional, does not involve a personal relationship but is
rather an exchange that can take place and does not have a lasting effect on the personal life of those involved (to the extent that
this may be debatable, I will address this later in my discussion).
To take another example, friendship is generally considered morally acceptable, but I think most people would agree
that it is morally unacceptable to sell it. However, there is a context in which it is sold: counseling services. In these services, a
counselor performs certain duties of a friendship—talking to a
person, listening to problems, offering advice, etc.—but the counselor has a clear arrangement distinguishing between when the
counselor is doing these duties on the job and when he/she is off
-duty. So, we could say it is immoral to sell a personal friendship
to another person, where there is no clear boundary between personal lives and occupation, but, as in the case of a counselor, it is
morally acceptable to sell the qualities of friendship, because
there is a distinct boundary between when the counselor is on
the job and when the counselor is not. It is by extension of this
reasoning, that I think prostitution can be considered morally
acceptable. As long as the prostitute is providing a service in
which there can remain a clear distinction between the service as
a part of the job and the personal life of the prostitute outside of
the job, then it is okay.
Melissa Farley, in Prostitution and the Invisibility of Harm,
makes the case that prostitution is psychologically harmful and,
as a result, permeates all aspects of a prostitute‘s life. She thereby
denies that a separation between the job and a personal life can

Prostitution and Casual Sex

13

occur.18 She claims that, because prostitution forces a person to
objectify his/her body in a way that is so demoralizing, that the
prostitute‘s self esteem and future sexual relations are affected.
However, whereas I acknowledge that the harm to the prostitute‘s psychological wellbeing is indeed real, I argue that it is because of social norms that the prostitute is harmed in such a
way—not because of something implicitly harmful about selling
sexual services. If we look at these services outside the context of
prostitution, the issue becomes clearer. There are many cases in
which a person performs sexual acts that the person does not desire, solely in order to receive some sort of compensation. These
acts rarely involve psychological harm. For example, a deceitful
wife may have unenjoyable sex with her husband purposely so
that her husband will continue to buy her jewelry. It would be
hard to believe that sex in this context gives her extreme psychological harm. However, let us consider that having sex with a
partner whom this person does not know is what is harmful,
supposing that this breech of intimacy is where the harm originates. This, still, does not seem to be the case, because many
people have one-night stands with people whom they do not
know and nonetheless they do not seem to experience harmful
psychological effects to the noticeable extent that Farley claims
prostitutes do.
So, perhaps we are next to infer that paying for sex is
what makes it psychologically harmful for prostitutes. The only
way this would make sense is if paying for sex is different than
paying for another service (assuming other service workers do
not experience similar psychological affects). This would imply
that sex is sacred or has some elevated quality that makes selling
it more affecting. This viewpoint, however, seems to subscribe to
Benatar‘s significance view, which I have rejected as not universally applicable and so not a viable criterion.
Ultimately, I think historical and current social norms regarding sex are the reasons prostitution is psychologically harmful to those involved. If prostitutes hold the belief that prostitution sells something that is especially significant, then it is obvious why they might experience psychological harm—because
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they might occasionally think that they are doing something
morally unacceptable. However, if they view prostitution as
something that is similar to any other service, then they would
not experience these harmful psychological affects, just as other
service workers do not experience harmful psychological affects.
Howard Klepper provides one more objection to prostitution, namely, that prostitutes, as rational beings, would never
consciously choose to sacrifice their freedom. Thus, their choice
must be a result of coercion.19 He sets up his argument with an
analogy, comparing prostitution to ―dwarf-throwing.‖ In dwarfthrowing, dwarves are singled out for their small size and consent to be tossed in the air by normal-sized people. This makes the
dwarves into ―human projectiles‖ which are considered ―nonrational, non-sentient‖ beings by amused onlookers.20 Klepper
argues that the dwarves, because they consent to being treated as
objects and thus as a mere means, are irrational agents, because
they choose to be treated this way. That judgment rings Kantian.
However, I argue that the dwarves are not treated as objects so understood. If the dwarves knowingly allow themselves to
be used in this way and are never forced to be tossed in the air,
then they still maintain autonomy as rational agents. Similarly,
an NBA basketball player may be sought out for his height and
asked to use his height in his profession, but he nonetheless
maintains autonomy as to whether or not his body will be used
for playing basketball. The dwarves also have autonomy, but,
most likely, people view tossing them in the air as objectifying
them because the dwarves seem to them to be small and so unable to defend themselves against larger people. However, as
long as the dwarves freely choose to act out the role of projectiles, then they are not objectified. I should note that this is as
long as the tossing of dwarves does not harm their body in any
way.
Concurrently, as we apply the dwarf example to prostitution, we also assume that the prostitutes‘ bodies are not harmed
in any way. If we extend Klepper‘s argument, it does not seem
that prostitutes would be any different than the dwarves or the
NBA player. When Klepper claims that prostitutes choose to act
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in way that limits their freedom, he relies on the idea that sexual
acts limit the freedom of those involved unlike any other action,
which is an idea that supports the significance view of sex which,
as I have previously determined, is not viable. Prostitutes are not
coerced. As long as prostitution is considered in the definition I
have provided, prostitutes consensually choose to trade sexual
services for monetary compensation. Thus, Klepper‘s objection
to prostitution is also unsubstantiated.
I will conclude my argument with a very common example of a morally acceptable job and compare it to prostitution to
show the way in which the two entail similar duties. During the
month of December, it is very common to see a person at the
mall who is dressed up as Santa Claus. He poses for pictures
with children while parents take pictures, and he receives money
as compensation for his service. As he sits in the mall, dressed in
a long white beard and a red satin robe, children desire to sit in
his lap to achieve the physical contact that is a source of enjoyment for them. The person playing Santa Claus, regardless of
what he may actually feel or want to say, must act happy
throughout the whole event and ask children what they want for
Christmas. People respect the man playing Santa Claus as freely
choosing to use his body for this service, though often people
neglect the fact that his obesity may pose potential health risks to
him. A prostitute, similarly, uses his/her body in order to provide a service of physical contact in which people attain enjoyment from the prostitute‘s body. However, it seems the prostitute may even have a better job than the man playing Santa
Claus, in that she is not always photographed, and she does not
have to maintain an unhealthily obese status in order to perform
her service.
Both the man playing Santa Claus and the prostitute use
their bodies to provide physical contact in return for money.
Each must potentially act contrary to personal feelings, seemingly sacrificing autonomy during their jobs. But this sacrifice
never actually occurs. They maintain the ability to quit their jobs,
which shows that they ultimately always have autonomy independent from whether or not they convey it in an obvious way
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during their services. In this way, prostitution can be thought of
as very similar to working as a holiday-season Santa Claus,
which is commonly considered a morally acceptable profession.
In summary, Kant‘s theory of ethics fails to show that
prostitution is always immoral. Furthermore, Singer‘s objections, along with my own, convey that prostitution can provide a
mutually beneficial service, in which both the service provider
and service receiver benefit from the exchange. Farley‘s objection relies on a faulty argument based on social norms rather
than criticizing something necessarily specific to prostitution,
and Klepper maintains the significance view, which is unconvincing at best. My final Santa Claus example shows the way in
which prostitution is not unlike many other professions, in that it
trades a physical service for monetary compensation. Unless we
want to claim that many sorts of actions of service are morally
unacceptable, we must consider prostitution as morally acceptable.
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